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Not rational, but not brutely causal either: 
A response to Fodor on concept acquisition
(Ni racional ni toscamente causal tampoco:  
una respuesta a Fodor sobre la adquisición de conceptos)
Louise Antony*
University of Massachusetts
ABSTRACT: Jerry Fodor has argued that concept acquisition cannot be a psychological or “ratio-
nal-causal” process, but can only be a “brute-causal” process of acquisition. This position generates the 
“doorknob → DOORKNOB” problem: why are concepts typically acquired on the basis of experience 
with items in their extensions? I argue that Fodor’s taxonomy of causal processes needs supplementation, 
and characterize a third type: what I call “intelligible-causal processes.” Armed with this new category I 
present what I regard as a better response than Fodor’s to the doorknob → DOORKNOB problem.
KEYWORDS: concept, nativism, acquisition, rational-causal, brute-causal, intelligible-causal, represen-
tation.
RESUMEN:  Jerry Fodor ha argüido que la adquisición de conceptos no puede ser un proceso psicológico o 
«causal-racional», sino que solamente puede ser un proceso de adquisición «causal-tosco». Esta postura da 
lugar al problema «pomo → POMO»: ¿Por qué los conceptos normalmente se adquieren a partir de experi-
encias de objetos que pertenecen a sus extensiones? Arguyo que la taxonomía de Fodor de los procesos causales 
necesita ser complementada, y caracterizo un tercer tipo de procesos a los que denomino «procesos causales-in-
teligibles». Basándome en esta nueva categoría, ofrezco una respuesta al problema pomo → POMO que, a mi 
juicio, es mejor que la respuesta de Fodor.
PALABRAS CLAVE: concepto, innatismo, adquisición, causal-racional, causal-tosco, causal-inteligible, 
representación.
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In The Language of Thought, Jerry Fodor argued—notoriously—that all (or almost all – a 
qualification I’ll ignore from hereon) of our concepts are innate. The argument went like 
this:
1. For a concept to be learned, the subject must project a hypothesis about the exten-
sion of the concept.
2. In order to project a hypothesis about the extension of a concept, the subject must 
already have the conceptual resources to represent the extension of that concept.
3. Having the conceptual resources to represent the extension of a concept is suffi-
cient for possessing the concept.
4. Therefore, no concept can be learned.
5. Therefore, every concept we possess is unlearned, i.e., innate.1
This conclusion seemed to many to be crazy; Dennett dubbed the view “Mad Dog Nativ-
ism,” a sobriquet Fodor cheerfully accepted.
However, Fodor modified his stand in later work (Fodor, 1998, 2008). While he 
continued to maintain that no primitive concept could be learned, he more recently al-
lowed that some concepts might be acquired. This is an important difference, especially 
in the computationalist tradition. Let me unpack it. Learning is a causal, computational 
process relating experience to a novel mental state such that, first, there is a rational re-
lation between the experience and the content of the subsequent mental state, and sec-
ond, the state-transitions between the experience and the end mental state mirror ra-
tional relations. “Rational relations” here is meant to include the steps of all reasoning 
processes—deductive inference, but also inductive and abductive reasoning and practical 
reasoning.
“Acquisition,” however, is non-specific. It covers any causal process that begins in expe-
rience and eventuates in a new mental content. To say that concepts can be acquired, there-
fore, is only to say that some experience caused the generation of the concept. There is no 
requirement that there be any rational—or even merely semantic—relation between the 
experience and the subsequently added concept. To say that concepts could be acquired, 
then, even if they couldn’t be learned, Fodor is explicitly allowing that the connection be-
tween experience and a concept it engenders could be completely fortuitous—a concept 
could arise “through surgical implantation; or by swallowing a pill, or by hitting one’s head 
against a hard surface” (Fodor 2008, p. 135).
But if saying that concepts can be acquired puts no constraints on the way that they 
can be acquired, a puzzle arises. There seems to be a regularity that goes unexplained: con-
cepts (empirical concepts, at any rate) seem to be acquired on the basis of certain particular 
kinds of experience, specifically, experiences of their instances. Why should this be? Fodor 
calls this the “doorknob → DOORKNOB” problem, and proposes to answer it by appeal 
to a particular kind of concept acquisition that he calls “triggering.”
Empirical concepts, he points out, are often associated with stereotypes. Stereotypes, we 
may suppose, are complex ideas consisting, perhaps, of visual images, general beliefs, and 
associated other ideas. Although concepts cannot be learned, Fodor says, stereotypes can. 
1 See (Fodor, 1975, Ch. 2, Sec. 3, “What the Private Language Must Be Like,” especially pp. 79-85). Fo-
dor gives a brief summary of this argument in (Fodor, 2008, pp. 129-30). 
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They can be learned inductively as statistical generalizations over experience. Once a stere-
otype has been learned, a procedure Fodor calls “locking” takes over—a new concept-type 
is “locked” onto the kind of which the stereotype is the stereotype. Schematically, trigger-
ing looks like this:
1. Experience → stereotype formation (P1)
2. P1 → locking = concept attainment (P2)
Fodor allows that the first step, P1, is a learning process, and hence a rational-causal pro-
cess.2 However, P2, Fodor tell us, is “some reliable, but not intentional (and hence, a for-
tiori, not inferential) neurological process” (Fodor, 2008, p. 151). Fodor goes on to tell us a 
little more about P2. It is, he says
…no sort of inference at all. It’s, as it were, a subintentional and subcomputational process; it’s a 
kind of thing that our sort of brain tissue just does. Psychology gets you from the initial state to 
P2; then neurology takes over and gets you the rest of the way to concept attainment… Inten-
tional explanation can’t, in any event, go all the way down on anybody’s story. Sooner or later 
neurology has to take over. (Fodor 2008, p. 152)
In saying that the process of triggering is “not intentional,” Fodor is saying that the states 
involved do not possess intentional content. For Fodor, this is another way of saying that 
these states do not fall within the domain of psychology. Psychology, for him, just is the sci-
ence of intentional states; the posits of psychology are structures and processes defined over 
states with intentional content. Intentional explanation is explanation in terms of states 
with intentional content. Given these assumptions, Fodor is committed to there being the 
following two types of causal process:
1. Rational-causal (Intentional, Psychological)
2. Brute-causal
This simple taxonomy of causal processes has been more or less presumed in the literature 
on mental processes, and is shared by both advocates and opponents of the idea that psy-
chological processes involve classical computation over structured representations. But I’m 
about to argue that this taxonomy is too simple—that it needs to be complicated.
In the first place, it’s useful to distinguish between two varieties of rational-causal pro-
cesses. The distinction is not an architectural one; rather it is semantic. All rational-causal 
processes mirror rational inferences, and could therefore with justice be called rule-follow-
ing processes. But in some inferences, there is an explicit representation of a rule, while in 
others there is not. Fodor did not find reason to discuss the notion of rule-following, be-
yond answering critics of LOT who claimed that he could not reconstruct the intuitive dif-
2 I do not see how Fodor can say this without an account of how brute-causal interactions between the 
environment and our sense organs become or generate states with intentional content. Once experi-
ence is conceptualized, it’s possible to see the inductive construction of a stereotype as an instance of 
learning. But what about that first step? It’s the ‘doorknob → DOORKNOB’ problem, or, if you will, 
the ‘round → ROUND’ problem all over again. That is, we need an account of why and how experi-
ences of round things reliably trigger deployment of the concept ROUND. 
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ference between processes that followed rules and processes that merely conformed to rules. 
His answer appears in a footnote in The Language of Thought, and is short enough to be 
quoted in full:
A […] chestnut of a question that is supposed to embarrass information flow psychologists 
goes like this: ‘If you are willing to attribute regularities in the behavior of organisms to rules that 
they unconsciously follow, why don’t you say (e.g.) that the planets ‘follow’ Kepler’s laws in pur-
suit of their orbits about the sun?’ [...]
It should now be clear how this sort of question is to be dealt with. What distinguishes what 
organisms do from what the planets do is that a representation of the rules they follow constitutes 
one of the causal determinants of their behavior. So far as we know, however, this is not true of the 
planets. (Fodor, 1975, p. 74n.)
This characterization certainly serves to characterize the causal processes involved when 
someone consciously and explicitly follows a rule, as when a beginning chess player recites 
the rule of castling to himself before making her move. Some un- or sub-conscious processes 
may also fit this characterization of rational-causal processes as well, perhaps those consti-
tuted by automated processes involving learned rules. But Fodor ought to have recognized 
that, by his own account, there must be processes that do not represent any rules, yet should 
still be counted as rule-following processes. Any primitive computational process must be 
of this sort. As Lewis Carroll so wittily pointed out, the rule that an inference is following 
is not fungible with a premise that expresses that rule—otherwise, an infinite regress ensues.
But if we cannot base the following/conforming-to distinction on whether or not the 
process involves the representation of a rule, how can we draw the distinction? What is the 
essence of a rational-causal process?
I suggest that rational-causal processes are distinguished from other kinds of processes 
in that they exhibit strong mirroring. A causal process exhibits strong mirroring just in case 
that process
a) involves a set of physical elements and physical states involving those elements, 
such that the elements at each stage of the process reflect, under intentional char-
acterization, the premises or conclusion of a valid or cogent inference, and
b) the properties of the physical elements to which the physical mechanism is causally 
sensitive mirror the logical or semantic properties of the premises and conclusion 
in virtue of which the mirrored inference is sound or cogent.
According to this definition, a primitive processor, like a logic gate, counts as a rational-
causal process because it strongly mirrors a primitive logical rule, even though it need not 
have any state that is interpretable as a representation of any logical rule. The physical 
states over which the causal process is defined will mirror primitive logical operations, like 
conjunction formation, because the physical properties of the states involved in the causal 
process will mirror the logically relevant features of propositions or truth-values. Thus 
primitive processers can be built out of many different kinds of physical material, and can 
involve marks on paper, electronic impulses, or neuronal signals.3 Complex processors can, 
3 Joseph Levine and I once built a binary adder out of our daughter’s fifth-grade class, following the de-
sign provided by David Macaulay in his excellent book The Way Things Work Now (2016 edition).
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of course, be built out of primitive processors by linking the primitive processors in strate-
gic ways.
I thus want to disagree with Fodor about what is necessary for a device’s being a rule-
following device—it is strong mirroring that’s necessary, and not there being an explicit 
representation of a rule somewhere in the causal etiology of the end state. We can, if we 
like, distinguish between those rational-causal processes in which some rule is explicitly 
represented and those in which there is not—in both cases, it will be the process’s exhib-
iting strong mirroring that makes it rational-causal. Whether or not there is a rule among 
the premises of the inference being performed is a matter that may be of interest to the the-
orist, but it is of no significance to the machine.
An example might help. Suppose I am in the process of learning to play chess, and I’m 
considering whether or not to castle. I might rehearse to myself the conditions on castling, 
note that I have violated one of these conditions, and then conclude that I may not castle. 
The reasoning would involve an inference that looks something like this:
1. If one has moved one’s king, one may not legally castle.
2. I have moved my king.
3. Therefore, I may not legally castle.
Premise (1) articulates (part of) the rule that I, the chess player, am following. The neuro-
logical machine that is realizing my thought process (AKA “my brain”) is also following a 
rule, but not the rule of castling. It is following the rule of modus ponens. This rule is no-
where represented in the inference itself; rather the causal processes occurring in my brain 
strongly mirror an inference that obeys that logical rule.
A final preliminary: I should say something about the idea of “representation” that I am 
presuming. First of all, I am taking “representation” to be interdefined with “intentional con-
tent:” a representation or representational state is an entity or state that has intentional con-
tent. Secondly, I follow Fodor and others in holding that there are two different ways in 
which an entity or state can come to have intentional content: the content can be derivative,4 
in which case it is conferred by some intentional agent or group of agents, or the content can 
be original. The intentionality of the representational states in digital computers is—at least 
for now—derivative, while the intentionality of naturally-existing minds must be original. 
Naturally-existing minds are where the intentionality buck stops. I am therefore committed 
to there being a naturalistic explanatory reduction of intentionality—that is, to there being 
an account of how materials that lack intentional content can, in a constitutive sense, give rise 
to material that possesses intentional content.5 This is too bad, because none of the proposed 
4 It is, to say the least, controversial where original intentionality comes from, and it may be misleading 
to speak of original intentionality as something that an entity or state can “come to have”, as if the en-
tity or state lacks original intentionality, and then gains it. Some, but by no means all philosophers of 
mind who believe in original intentionality think this way. Fodor does not think this way; the posses-
sion of original intentionality is something that is coeval with the complicated nomological connec-
tions between mind and world that Fodor thinks constitute original intentionality. 
5 Strictly speaking, the thesis that there exists a naturalistic basis for intentionality is independent of 
there being an account of this basis. But skeptics about the first would be silenced if we could produce 
the second. Psychology is subject to doubts that don’t seem to plague physics, even though no one can 
produce a theory that unifies gravity and quantum mechanics.
Louise Antony
50 Theoria, 2020, 35/1, 45-57
naturalistic accounts of intentionality seem to work. What I do think I have an account of, 
however, is how, in a causal sense, a state that lacks intentional content can give rise to a state 
that possesses intentional content. That’s a bit of progress.
Understanding “rational-causal” in the way I’ve suggested allows us to differentiate ra-
tional-causal processes from brute-causal processes, and hence to distinguish learning pro-
cesses from processes of mere acquisition in the way Fodor wants. So consider the follow-
ing pair of cases:
A. The parent of a toddler points to a doorknob and says to the toddler “That’s a 
doorknob.” That causes the toddler to token the concept DOORKNOB.
B. A toddler bumps their head on the top bunk of their bed. That jiggles the brain of the 
toddler in such a way as to cause the toddler to token the concept DOORKNOB.
Case A is a paradigmatic case of concept learning. There is a rational causal process (or so 
we may suppose) that links the toddler’s hearing and understanding the parent’s (reliable) 
assertion that the thing they are looking at is a thing called a “doorknob,” and generates (as 
we may suppose) a concept—a mental lexeme—dedicated to representing things like it, i.e., 
doorknobs.6 Case B is a good example of what Fodor would disparagingly call “mere acqui-
sition” —there is no reason under the sun why a bump on the head should trigger the for-
mation of the concept DOORKNOB—the connection between experience and concept is 
utterly fortuitous.
But it’s important to see that the crucial work here is being done by the requirement 
that there be strong mirroring, and not just by the requirement that there be a rational rela-
tion between the intentional content of the cause and the intentional content of the effect. 
The states of a brute-causal process may well lack original intentionality, but even if we 
were to impose upon them some derivative representational contents, so as to make it ap-
pear that the process is a rational one, the causal transitions involving them will not mirror 
any inferential process. For we must remember that strong mirroring requires more than 
there being some interpretation of states such that the causal sequence of those states looks 
like a rational inference when viewed under intentional interpretation; it must be that the 
physical properties of the state to which the process is sensitive themselves mirror the logi-
cal/intentional properties of the inference.7
To see this, consider another case where we would want to make a distinction between 
two types of acquisition.
C. A toddle bumps their head on the top bunk of their bed. Perception of the bump 
causes a (first) tokening of the concept BUMP.
D. A toddler bumps their head on the top bunk of their bed. That jiggles the brain of 
the toddler in such a way as to cause a (first) tokening of the concept BUMP.
Case (C) is an example of what we imagine to be the usual case of concept acquisition 
through experience. Case (D), on the other hand, is anomalous. Yet the relation between 
6 Many details are here suppressed. See (Margolis, 1999) for a plausible story that fills these in. 
7 Thus we cannot, as John Searle insisted we could, simply “treat” any old state of affairs as the realiza-
tion of a computational device (Searle, 1980). The conditions for strong mirroring—satisfaction of 
which I would take to be necessary for something’s really being a computational device/being—cannot 
be met by stipulation.
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the “content” of the experience and the content of the concept acquired because of the ex-
perience is the same in both cases. If we can speak of the experience as having content at all, 
the content of the experience is the same in both cases. The difference, if there is one, lies 
in the way in which the new concept arises, given the experience. Intuitively, we want to say 
that in Case (C), the concept is somehow based on the experience that caused it, while this 
is not so in Case (D).
Now we have to agree with Fodor that not even properly based concept acquisition can 
be a rational-causal process. (I want to say the same thing about properly based perceptual 
belief, which is why I’m doubtful about the P1 step in Fodor’s account of triggering. I’ll say 
more about this below.) The reason goes back to Fodor’s original argument for Mad Dog 
Nativism, and involves our taking seriously the idea bruited above that we can meaning-
fully speak of “the content” of an experience. For the toddler (or anyone) to learn that a 
certain kind of experience is called BUMP is for them to draw a rational inference from an 
experiential state with intentional content to a state that involves the tokening of a concept 
that characterizes that sort of experience. But what could the intentional content of this 
experience be? If the experience itself involves the deployment of the concept BUMP, then 
one would have to already possess the concept that is supposedly being acquired.8
To distinguish the first case from the second, then, we need to say something about 
how the causal processes eventuated in the acquisition of a concept, and why one way (the 
way it happened in Case (C)) is epistemically good, and the other way (Case (D)) is not. 
Here I think it will be helpful to bring in some points from the epistemological debate 
about internalism and externalism about perceptual justification.
Externalists about perceptual knowledge hold that, as long as the right sort of rela-
tion holds between a perceptual belief and the state of affairs the belief represents, the be-
lief counts as knowledge. Crucially, the externalist requires nothing of the subject—they do 
not have to be aware of or understand what the relation is between their belief and the state 
of affairs it represents, much less understand how that relation is forged or maintained. 
A common form of externalism is reliabilism, the view that knowledge consists in relia-
bly formed belief. Normal perception is held to be a reliable process par excellence: certain 
states of affairs reliably give rise to certain sorts of perceptual experience, which in turn, re-
liably give rise to perceptual beliefs that such states of affairs obtain. Internalists object—
they maintain that there are conditions internal to the subject that must be satisfied in or-
der for the subject to be properly said to know. Many internalists say that these conditions 
must involve some sort of conscious awareness on the part of the subject—in the case of 
perception, some kind of rational recognition that an experience of a certain sort warrants 
a belief with a certain content.
The internalist’s objection to externalism is that without there being some kind of ra-
tional connection between perceptual state and subsequent perceptual belief, the citing of a 
perceptual encounter falls far short of justification—it is rather, as some philosophers have 
8 Of course, in my parade case of concept learning, I posited, in the toddler, both a full-blown inten-
tional state (the state of the toddler’s thinking <MY PARENT SAID THAT WAS CALLED A 
“BUMP”>) and conscious awareness of an inference (<MY PARENT IS PRETTY RELIABLE 
ABOUT WHAT THINGS ARE CALLED, SO I’LL HERETOFORE THINK OF THINGS LIKE 
THAT AS BUMPS>). But concept acquisition—triggering in the good cases—doesn’t involve either 
causation by a fully intentional state, or causal processes that strongly mirror rational inferences. 
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put it, a “mere exculpation” (McDowell, 1994, p. 20). My gloss on this somewhat puzzling 
statement is this. Given natural law and antecedent circumstances, the subject couldn’t 
help but form the belief, any more than a window can help but break when hit by an errant 
baseball. The perceptual experience can explain causally why the subsequent belief occurs, 
but causes do not in general justify their effects—it’s a kind of category mistake to think 
that they do.
Although I want to agree with the externalists that perceptual justification doesn’t—
probably can’t, on pain of infinite regress—require any awareness of the circumstances that 
justify perceptual belief, I also think that the internalists have a point. In the terms of our 
current discussion, I want to say that brute-causal processes can only provide exculpation, 
when what we want is a type of process that somehow constitutes justification. Otherwise, 
we won’t be able to distinguish the perceptually based belief from beliefs fortuitously caused 
by a perceptual experience. Ditto, mutatis mutandis, for properly based concept acquisition 
from acquisition that merely happens to involve perception. My suggestion is that we can 
do this if we distinguish causal processes that utilize information from those that do not. 
This means adding a third category to our taxonomy of causal processes—a category I’ll call 
intelligible-causal processes.
To explain what I have in mind here, I want first to introduce the notion of a Dret-
skean representation. The root notion here is the notion of carrying information, where 
“information” is understood in the information-theoretic sense that Fred Dretske ap-
pealed to in developing his theory of mind and knowledge (Dretske, 1981, 1988) . In the 
strict sense, a signal s carries the information that p just in case the probability of p’s being 
the case, given the occurrence of s, is equal to 1. But this is an idealization. In reality, there 
is virtually no signal that carries information in this strict sense, unless we allow that infor-
mational content is always massively disjunctive. To get a usable notion of informational 
content, we can lower the probability threshold, effectively setting aside extremely unlikely 
causes of everyday events. Thus we can say that the pattern of rings on a tree stump “car-
ries information” about the age of the tree it was once part of, despite the fact that the pat-
tern could have been caused by things other than the tree’s having lived a certain number 
of years. It could have been caused, for example, by an extremely skilled special-effects artist 
or by even by mere chance. Still, neither of these is very likely, particularly if we expand the 
modulus of stimulation to include witnessing the felling of the tree. So let’s set the prob-
ability threshold somewhat lower than but still pretty close to 1. In this somewhat relaxed 
sense, then, I claim that perceptual states are Dretskean representations, and carry informa-
tion about their causes.9
Let me, by contrast, characterize what I call Gricean representations. Gricean repre-
sentations are so-called because they possess what Paul Grice called “non-natural meaning” 
(Grice, 1957). (Dretskean representations possess what Grice called “natural” meaning.) 
For Gricean representation R has non-natural meaning m only if it’s not the case that an 
occurrence of R entails that m. Thus, the bus conductor’s ringing the bell three times non-
9 I don’t invoke this relaxed sense of “information” because I shrink from the consequence that other-
wise I’d have to say that the informational content of a perceptual state is disjunctive, making all per-
ceptual states veridical, and perceptual illusion impossible. I’m prepared to bite that bullet. See (An-
tony, 2011).
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naturally means that (as it might be) that the bus is approaching the Finchley Road stop, 
because it’s possible for the conductor to ring the bell three times without the bus’s ap-
proaching the Finchley Road stop. And it is—the conductor may have made a mistake, or 
may be deliberately trying to deceive the passengers. Thus, it’s criterial of a thing’s possess-
ing Gricean meaning (in my sense) that it not carry information about its causes. That is, it 
must be possible for a Gricean representation to occur in the absence of any of its causes. It 
will turn out that concepts are Gricean representations.
I want to apply this distinction, between Dretskean and Gricean representations, 
to the distinction, as Fodor draws it (Fodor, 2007) between non-conceptual and con-
ceptual representation. The basic idea is that non-conceptual representation is picture-
like— “iconic” —and conceptual representation is language-like— “discursive.” Fodor 
argues that perceptual representation, at least in its early stages, is non-conceptual, and 
hence iconic, and that representation in thought is conceptual, and hence discursive. I 
want to say—and Fodor absolutely did not agree with me about this [personal conversa-
tion]—non-conceptual representations are Dretskean, and that only conceptual repre-
sentations are Gricean. The task of explaining concept acquisition is then the task of ex-
plaining how Dretskean representations with a certain informational content give rise 
to Gricean representations which render that content in a conceptual form, in a non-
fortuitous way.
Dretskean respresentations often encode some of the information that they carry. By 
this I mean simply that there is often some regular correspondence between, on the one 
hand, physical features of the information-bearing state, and on the other, aspects of the in-
formation that the state carries. In the case of the tree stump, for example, every set of alter-
nating dark and light circles on the stump corresponds to a single year of growth. When an 
information-bearing state thus encodes information that it carries, an observer who knows 
the code can extract the information from the physical character of the state. Dretskean 
representations are, in this sense, interpretable. This fact does not make the informational 
content of a Dretskean representation observer-relative, or non-objective in any way. And 
the fact that a Dretskean representation is interpretable is, similarly, fully objective. That 
information can be extracted from an information-bearing state remains true whether or 
not it is actually extracted.
Since encoding is a matter of the presence of certain physical features, we can imagine 
physical devices that are sensitive to the particular physical features of the Dretskean repre-
sentation that realize the encoding. Consider our tree stump again. Given that the pattern 
of light and dark rings effects the encoding of the age of the tree when it was felled, if we 
can find a physical device that is sensitive to patterns of light and dark, we can use it to cal-
culate the age of the tree. And of course, we can find such a device—the human eye! If we 
are enterprising and clever, we might be able to build an artificial device that could, with-
out our attending to it, calculate the age of the tree. Perhaps—and I’m no doubt betray-
ing here my ignorance of many things—we could rig up a tiny wheeled cart equipped with 
an extremely sensitive thermometer, which is in turn hooked up to a register. The idea is 
that as the cart is wheeled over the surface of the tree stump, the thermometer detects the 
very slight temperature gradients of the dark and light rings; every other time a gradient is 
crossed, the register clicks over. The cart will stop at the center of the stump. At the end 
of the exercise, the register will display a number of clicks corresponding to the number of 
rings, which in turn corresponds to the number of years the tree is alive.
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I’m sure something like this could work; at least pretend with me that it does. What 
would we have if it did? We would have a computational device that, when applied to the 
right sort of stimulus (i.e., an information-bearing state of a specific kind), generates a rep-
resentation of the age of a tree. But our device does not do this by strongly mirroring any 
inference. The intermediate states of the tree-ring counter do not correspond to the prem-
ises of any argument, nor are the state changes in the tree-ring counter sensitive to proper-
ties that encode steps in any inference.10 Still, it is no accident that there is a reliable corre-
spondence between the age of a tree, and the number of clicks on the register of a tree-ring 
counter that is run over the tree’s stump. We, the inventor-observer, built the little thing 
in order to exploit what we can recognize as an evidential relation between the number of 
rings on the stump and the age of the tree.
Because of the sensitivity of the tree-ring counter to the physical parameters that en-
code information about the age of the tree, I want to say that the device utilized the infor-
mation inherent in the pattern of tree rings, in a very real sense of “utilized.” We could say, 
looking at the whole setup from the outside, that the register count is based on information 
about the age of the tree.
With this example as an illustration, let me now characterize the third kind of causal 
process, the one I want to add to the standard taxonomy: I call it intelligible causation. The 
causal relation, in my example, is intelligible in the following sense: the causal relation be-
tween the tree stump surface and the end state of the register is such that the information 
encoded in the tree rings, if specified discursively, would provide an evidential basis for the 
content we ascribe to the register count. But it’s not that we simply choose to regard the 
cause and effect states in this way—unlike the cases of brain jiggling discussed earlier—it 
is not an accident that the tree stump pattern causes the tree-ringer counter to register the 
number that it does. It is not fortuitous that this causal process produced the result that it 
did.
Intelligible-causal processes, then are processes that resemble rational-causal processes 
in that they involve input-output relations that can be usefully characterized in intentional 
terms, but they differ from rational-causal processes in that they do not strongly mirror any 
valid or cogent inference from the intentional content ascribed to the input state to the in-
tentional content ascribed to the end state. They resemble brute-causal processes, then, in 
that they do not strong mirror an inference, but they differ from brute-causal processes in 
10 It may be true that the intermediate stages of the operating device mirror lines in a counting sequence. 
But counting is not inferring, and the mirroring of a counting sequence is not a classical inference. 
When we count, we do not infer the next number in the sequence from the previous number— “7” 
does not implicitly follow from “6.” We can imagine an inference that goes like this: “1) there are six 
things. 2) if there is one more thing added, then there are seven things. 3) One more is added. There-
fore, (4), there are seven things.” But our tree-ring counter is clearly not strongly mirroring that infer-
ence, since it does not represent either premise (2) or premise (3). Neither does it follow the rule given 
in premise (2), because the counter is only sensitive to local information about the particular rings it 
is hovering over, and thus does implicitly represent any specific numbers. Ah—you may think—but 
maybe the rule that the device is following is more general than the rule I’ve given; maybe it’s some-
thing like this: “if there are n things, and one more is added, then then are n + 1 things.” But our de-
vice can’t be following that rule, because in order to do so, it would have to have the capacity to per-
form arbitrary acts of adding one. And it can’t do that.
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that the fact that the connection between the input and output states considered under in-
tentional interpretation is not fortuitous. It is not an accident that the causal process sus-
tains intentional characterization. Since they are neither rational-causal nor brute pro-
cesses, I say that intelligible-causal processes weakly mirror valid or cogent inferences. Weak 
mirroring obtains if and only if:
1. the input to the process, construed under appropriate intentional interpretation, 
bears a rational relation to the output, similarly construed. An intentional inter-
pretation is appropriate iff
a) the input state is a Dretskean representation (and thus carries information)
b) the intentional interpretation of the Dretskean representation gives one cor-
rect specification of (part or all of) the informational content of the Dretskean 
representation.
2. The causal process that links input and output exploits the physical properties of 
the input that encode the information carried by the Dretskean representation.
Three notes: First, the fanciful (or “ridiculous”) example of an intelligible-causal pro-
cess that I described above involves an artifact. The tree-ring counter was designed to ex-
ploit the relation between the number of rings on the stump and the age of the tree it came 
from. But this should not make you think that intelligible-causal processes require delib-
erate agency or design. Such processes can—and do—arise naturally. Second, the defini-
tion of “weak mirroring” says nothing about the status of the output state. I want to allow 
that that can be itself a Dretskean representation, but that it can also be a Gricean repre-
sentation. Either way, the content of the output state will constrain the “appropriate in-
tentional interpretation of the process.” If the output state is Dretskean, the interpreta-
tion that makes the process intelligible will have to be a correct specification of part or all 
of the informational content. Typically, of course, the informational content will be some 
part of the informational content of the input state. If the output state is Gricean, the in-
tentional content of that state will be determined by the relation that determines Gricean 
content. In the case of the tree-ring counter, the content of the output state will be derived 
content—a number—which it has because we interpret it as expressing a number. But 
here again, on the presumption that original intentionality is constituted by some natural, 
non-intentional relation, the content of the output state might be fixed independently of 
the intentions, interpretations, or interests of the observer. “Appropriate intentional in-
terpretation” must then respect the objective content of the Gricean representation that 
is the output of the intelligible-causal process. Third, the entire process is not psychologi-
cal. Psychological processes (and Fodor would agree with this) relate only things that both 
have genuinely intentional content—in my parlance, they relate only Gricean vehicles to 
Gricean vehicles.11
So, at long last, here’s what I have to say about concept “triggering.” When an empiri-
cal concept is acquired on the basis on its instances, what happens is that (a) a perceptual 
11 I’ve only given atomic concepts as examples of Gricean vehicles, but I am presuming, as is standard, 
that atomic concepts, if composed properly, can combine to form complex Gricean vehicles that have 
propositional content.
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encounter with an instance of the concept produces a Dretskean representation that car-
ries information to the effect that a thing of a certain kind, K, is before you; and then (b) 
that this input intelligibly causes the tokening of a Gricean representation that has as its 
content ‘BEING K’12. There are two distinguishable ways, then, that a toddler’s bumping 
his head could result in his acquiring the concept BUMP. On one way, it’s simply an acci-
dent—a brute-causal process—that the toddler tokens a concept that (because of satisfying 
the naturalistic conditions sufficient for representing bumps) means BUMP. On the other 
way, the head bump initiates an intelligible-causal process that eventuates in a tokening of 
the concept BUMP. Now we have the needed distinctions, without having to suppose that 
concept learning occurs, but also without having to stigmatize normal concept acquisition 
as “merely brutely-causal.”
Recall the two-part account of triggering that Fodor offers in LOT 2:
1. Experience → stereotype formation (P1)
2. P1 → locking = concept attainment (P2)
What I want to say now is that Fodor might be wrong (depending on how the empiri-
cal details turn out) about the character of both P1 and P2. Neither is psychological/ra-
tional—causal, and neither is brute-causal either. Both are intelligible-causal. P1 might 
turn out to be an intelligible-causal process that extracts statistical regularities from per-
ceptual encounters with, for example, horses, and builds a Dretskean representation that 
encodes these regularities.13 Then, a separate process takes this constructed representation 
and generates a Gricean representation – a concept.
SPECIAL BONUS MATERIAL!!! I think that what I have to say about the differ-
ence between Dretskean and Gricean representation nicely complements Fodor’s way of 
drawing the non-conceptual/conceptual distinction, and actually explains the structural 
distinction between representations that satisfy the picture principle (that is, that every 
part of a picture represents a part of what’s represented) and those that don’t (i.e., represen-
tations that fail to respect the picture principle because they have a canonical representa-
tion). I don’t have space here to explain all that here, but details are forthcoming.
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